By general agreement, Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations (Soph. el.) is a sort of companion or appendix to the Topics. This raises the question whether its thirteen types of fallacious refutation (traditionally called “the thirteen fallacies”) are as many topoi. In the Latin Middle Ages this was a standard assumption, and for the medievals this had consequences for the way they interpreted the Soph. el. Modern commentators have shown little interest in the question. The essay will first examine the textual evidence for holding that Aristotle considered the fallacies topoi. The evidence is less clear than appears from modern editions, but it will be concluded that Aristotle did, indeed, think of the fallacies as topoi. Next, it will be argued that this being presupposed, we ought to consider re-introducing the medieval notion of sophistical pseudo-maxims corresponding to the genuine dialectical maxims of the Topics.